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The similarities between the stock market crash of 1929 and the 
recent financial recession are striking.1 In the wake of the lowest levels 
 
*
 Mr. Koebel received his J.D. and Securities Law Certificate cum laude from The Catholic 
University of America, Columbus School of Law and his B.A. magna cum laude from the 
University of Maryland, Baltimore County.  
1 See, e.g., Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The Global Financial Crisis and Its Impact on 
World Trade and the World Economy—An Overview, 41 UCC L. J. 375 (2009) (describing a 
crisis of confidence during the recent recession as “[e]veryone ran for the exits at once, short 
selling became endemic, and demand for all securities shriveled. The U.S. stock markets 
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of investor confidence in recent times, Congress has wrestled with 
equally historic financial regulatory reform.2 As bank accounts begin to 
recover and stock indices rise, however, public opinion toward our 
financial infrastructure remains at recession levels.3 
Congressmen on both sides of the aisle agree that the restoration of 
consumer confidence is crucial to a meaningful financial recovery.4 
 
lost almost $7 trillion in value as Wall Street had its worst year since 1931.”); Jarad D. 
Hunter, Comment, “No Crying in Baseball”—And No More Crying On the Stock Markets: 
An Alternate-Hybrid Approach to Self-Regulation, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 639, 643 (2005). In 
the immediate aftermath of the Crash of 1929, investor confidence was at such a low that 
federal intervention, a first in the securities markets, was needed. Id. The Investor 
Confidence Index measures the level at 92.1 in August 2010, compared to 86.9 in January 
2009, and 135.5 in January 2001. Investor Confidence Index Historical Data, STATE STREET 
(2010), http://internet.statestreet.com/industry_insights/investor_confidence_index/historical 
data.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2010). In October 2009, the Financial Trust Index was at 22%. 
Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, The Results: Wave IV, CHI. BOOTH/KELLOGG SCH. 
FINANCIAL TRUST INDEX (Oct. 19, 2009), available at http://www.financialtrustindex.org 
/resultswave4.htm. See also Mark Gongloff, Alex Frangos & Tom Lauricella, Markets 
Swoon on Fears, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article 
/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB10001424052748704901104575423422838391134.html (“Market 
sentiment has soured quickly [as of August 2010]. It underscores just how jittery investors 
remain nearly two years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. sent markets 
world-wide crashing.”); Peter Wallsten & Eliza Gray, Grim Voter Mood Turns Grimmer, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870490110457 
5423674269169684.html (“Nearly two-thirds of Americans believe the economy has yet to 
hit bottom, a sharply higher percentage than the 53% who felt that way in January [2010].”). 
2 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124. Stat. 1376 (2010). The Act was signed into law on July 21, 2010. Id. See also 
Kevin Drawbaugh, U.S. Congress Nears Financial Rules Reform Milestone, REUTERS, Nov. 
30, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN3045283120091130 (detailing House 
proposals and “measures dealing with the systemic risks from the collapse of large, troubled 
financial firms” in committee); Kevin G. Hall, House to Wall St.: ‘Party is Over’, POST-
GAZETTE, Dec. 12, 2009, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/09346/1020450-
84.stm?cmpid=nationworld.xml (describing the House’s passage of the Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, “designed to bring the most sweeping rewrite of 
financial regulation since the New Deal era following the Great Depression.”); Marshall 
McKay, Financial Reform Passed, Implications Still Unclear, FINANCE & COMMERCE (July 
29, 2010, 2:07 PM), http://finance-commerce.com/2010/07/financial-reform-passed-
implications-still-unclear/ (detailing passage of the Act); 20 Ways U.S. House, Senate 
Financial Reforms Differ, REUTERS, Jan. 6, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
idUSN2919483620100106 (detailing markedly different Senate proposals); discussion infra 
Part II.A. 
3 See Investor Confidence Index Historical Data, supra note 1. 
4 See, e.g., Bill Bradley, Op-Ed., Five Ways to Restore Financial Trust, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 19, 2009, at A19 (“Restoring trust in the financial system is the key to solving the 
current economic crisis.”); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Remarks by Assistant 
Secretary Michael Barr on Regulatory Reform to the Exchequer Club (July 15, 2009), 
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg213.htm (“To rebuild trust in our 
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However, Congress’ solution—the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act—fails to adequately address the importance 
of investor confidence and instead threatens to preserve the status quo.5 
The status quo—an industry that has betrayed investors’ trust—will not 
serve the nation’s interests in restoring investor confidence and in long-
term financial recovery. 
Although the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter 
“SEC”) has proven itself to be largely successful in its oversight of 
securities investment professionals, recent missteps in the midst of the 
financial crisis6 necessitate organizational change in the regulatory 
regime. Just as the SEC was born out of the market crash of 1929,7 this 
crisis of confidence calls for a response that actively culls a perception 
of a trustworthy and accountable infrastructure; the industry must hold 
itself accountable through the increased intermediary oversight 
involving self-regulatory organizations. 
Self-regulatory organizations (hereinafter “SROs”) set rules 
governing member firms in the financial industry and provide oversight, 
supplementing that of the SEC.8 SROs report to the SEC, which subjects 
 
markets, we need strong and consistent regulation and supervision of consumer financial 
services and investment markets.”); Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the 
President After Regulatory Reform Meeting (Feb. 25, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-after-regulatory-reform-
meeting (“[T]o rebuild trust in our markets, we must redouble our efforts to promote 
openness, transparency and plain language throughout our financial system.”); Press 
Release, The White House, Remarks by the President on 21st Century Financial Recovery 
Reform (June 17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ 
Remarks-of-the-President-on-Regulatory-Reform/ (stating that the goal is to restore honest 
markets). 
5 See discussion infra Part III. 
6 See discussion infra Part I.C.2. 
7 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b(4) (2006) (describing national emergencies as reasons for 
regulation); Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785, 
787 (2009) (“Indeed, the SEC owes its existence to the stock market crash of 1929 and the 
subsequent Great Depression.”); The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, 
Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION, http://sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Oct. 11, 2010) [hereinafter 
“SEC”] (describing SEC’s creation as a result of Congressional findings for the need to 
restore public confidence following the market crash of 1929). 
8 See About the Finanical Industry Regulatory Authority, FINRA, 
http://www.finra.org/AboutFINRA/ (last visited Oct, 11, 2010) [hereinafter FINRA]. From 
FINRA’s website: 
FINRA touches virtually every aspect of the securities business—from 
registering and educating industry participants to examining securities firms; 
writing rules; enforcing those rules and the federal securities laws; informing 
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SRO rules to an approval process.9 SROs, in one incarnation or another, 
existed before the SEC and federal regulation of securities.10 The largest 
and most well-known securities SRO today is the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority (hereinafter “FINRA”), created in 2007 through 
the consolidation of the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(hereinafter “NASD”) and the New York Stock Exchange (hereinafter 
“NYSE”).11 FINRA provides oversight of member brokerage firms, and 
nearly every brokerage firm in the United States is required to be a 
member.12 
Although broker-dealers are subject to dual oversight by FINRA 
 
and educating the investing public; providing trade reporting and other industry 
utilities; and administering the largest dispute resolution forum for investors and 
registered firms. We also perform market regulation under contract for the 
major U.S. stock markets, including the New York Stock Exchange, NYSE 
Arca, NYSE Amex, The NASDAQ Stock Market and the International 
Securities Exchange. 
Id. See also Mun. Sec. Rulemaking Bd., About MSRB, MSRB, http://emma.msrb.org 
/AboutEMMA/AboutMSRB.aspx (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) [hereinafter MSRB]. The 
Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) “develop[s] rules for broker-dealers and 
banks that underwrite, trade and sell municipal securities – bonds, notes and other securities 
issued by states, cities, and counties or their agencies to help finance public projects or for 
other public purposes.” Id.  
9 See Rulemaking Process, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/Industry/Regulation/ 
FINRARules/RulemakingProcess/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2010) (“SEC staff reviews the rule 
proposal to determine whether it is consistent with the requirements of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC staff may request changes or amendments to the rule 
proposal.”); MSRB, supra note 8. 
10 See William I. Friedman, The Fourteenth Amendment’s Public/Private Distinction 
Among Securities Regulators in the U.S. Marketplace—Revisited, 23 ANN. REV. BANKING & 
FIN. L. 727, 730 (2004); infra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. In the beginning, the 
stock exchanges governed themselves with no federal or state government oversight. 
Friedman, supra. As part of the regulatory reform after the 1929 market crash, Congress set 
in motion legislation to create SRO’s as “full-fledged quasi-governmental entities charged 
with enforcing federal securities laws . . . .” Id. See also History, NYSE EURONEXT, 
http://www.nyse.com/about/history/1089312755484.html (last visited Oct 11, 2010) 
[hereinafter “NYSE”] (tracing the NYSE’s origins to 1792).  
11 See FINRA, supra note 8 (“[FINRA] is the largest independent regulator for all 
securities firms doing business in the United States. All told, FINRA oversees nearly 4,750 
brokerage firms, about 167,000 branch offices and approximately 634,000 registered 
securities representatives.”); see also Cory Alpert, Financial Services in the United States 
and the United Kingdom: Comparative Approaches to Securities Regulation and Dispute 
Resolution, 5 B.Y.U. INT’L L. & MGMT. REV. 75, 77 (2008) (“FINRA is the largest non-
government regulator for all securities firms doing business in the United States.”). 
12 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (2006) (prohibiting a broker-dealer from effecting most 
securities transactions unless such broker-dealer is a member of a registered SRO); FINRA, 
supra note 8. 
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and the SEC, a regulatory gap exists with respect to investment 
advisers.13 No SRO exists for investment advisers; the SEC is the only 
federal regulator vested with oversight authority over them.14 Investment 
advisers have recently come to the forefront of the debate over 
investment regulation reform. Any reasonably informed American is 
familiar with the Bernie Madoff fraud, which largely took place in his 
firm’s investment adviser department and remained undiscovered by the 
SEC despite numerous and credible warnings.15 As such, much debate 
exists over the future of investment adviser regulation and which 
agency should be entrusted with that authority.16 Some call for 
expanding SEC resources,17 while others call for the extension of 
FINRA’s authority to encompass registered investment advisers.18 
Congress has responded with its passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter “Dodd-Frank 
Act”).19 An early version of the House’s Wall Street Reform bill vested 
FINRA with regulatory and enforcement authority over investment 
advisers, but that provision has since been eliminated.20 Instead, the final 
 
13 See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text. 
14 See discussion infra Part I.A.2. 
15 See discussion infra Part I.C.2. 
16 See discussion infra Part II; see also Addressing the Need for Comprehensive 
Regulatory Reform: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 7-8 (2009) 
(statement of Timothy F. Geithner, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury), available at 
http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/geithner032609.pdf (arguing for 
the closing of regulatory gaps); Interim Report of the Committee on Capital Markets 
Regulation, COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, 2-6 (Nov. 30, 2006), available 
at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf [hereinafter 
“Interim Report”] (advocating for the creation of a self-regulatory organization for 
investment advisers). 
17 See discussion infra Part II.C. The SEC itself is one of the most vocal opponents of 
this position. See Rich Edson, SEC Gives Wish List of ‘Wish List’ of 42 Changes It Wants in 
Securities Law, FOXBUSINESS.COM (July 16, 2009), http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/ 
markets/industries/government/sec-gives-wish-list--changes-wants-securities-law/.  
18 See discussion infra Part II.B. Likewise, FINRA is its own greatest advocate. See 
Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities Markets – Part II: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement 
of Richard G. Ketchum, Chairman and Chief Exec. Officer, FINRA), available at 
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/Speeches/Ketchum/P118298 [hereinafter “Ketchum”] 
(advocating for FINRA’s oversight authority to encompass investment advisers). 
19 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124. Stat. 1376 (2010). 
20 See discussion infra Part II.A; see also House Passes Wall Street Reform Legislation, 
16 No. 7 MONEY MANAGER’S COMPLIANCE GUIDE NEWSLETTER 2 (2010) (stating that “[t]he 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act had a provision that would have given 
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Dodd-Frank Act calls for a six-month study regarding the need for 
enhanced oversight resources for investment advisers.21 This response is 
not a solution; it threatens to return regulation of investment advisers to 
the status quo, sidelining critical concerns for investor trust and failing 
to respond to calls for real regulatory reform. 
This Article addresses the importance of investor trust in the 
context of current investment regulatory reform efforts. Part I.A 
provides an overview of the securities regulatory framework, focusing 
on self-regulatory organizations and the regulation of investment 
advisers and broker-dealers. Part I.B discusses the role of trust in 
economic transactions and recovery. Part I.C examines the strengths and 
weaknesses of SRO and SEC enforcement tools, with particular 
emphasis on recent frauds. Part II discusses relevant provisions of the 
Dodd-Frank Act, as well as the recent reorganization within the SEC, 
and introduces the debate surrounding the expansion of FINRA’s 
authority. Finally, Part III discusses the ramifications of the 
Congressional response to the crisis. This Article argues for the 
extension of FINRA’s oversight authority to encompass the investment 
adviser industry so as to restore trust in the securities regulatory 
infrastructure, lest investors fail to regain the confidence needed for 
long-term financial recovery. 
 
[FINRA] ‘sweeping rule-making authority’” over investment advisers.); Melanie Waddell, 
FINRA Provision Deleted from Reform Bill, INVESTMENT ADVISOR (Dec. 11, 2009), 
http://www.investmentadvisor.com/News/2009/12/Pages/FINRA-Provision-Deleted-From-
Reform-Bill.aspx (“The provision that would have given FINRA the authority to inspect and 
regulate any investment advisor associated with a broker/dealer was successfully deleted 
from the huge financial services reform bill . . . .”); U.S. House Nixes FINRA Regulation of 
Advisers, FA NEWS (Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.fa-mag.com/fa-news/4902-us-house-nixes-
finra-regulation-of-advisors.html (“Legislation that would have empowered self-regulatory 
organizations, such as the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, to regulate investment 
advisors was defeated . . . .”). Indeed, the Obama administration has pushed for greater 
harmonization of the broker-dealer and investment adviser professions, including standards 
of care. See generally Nikhil Bhargava, Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers: The 
Administration’s Plans for the Future of Regulation, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 907 (2009); Arthur 
B. Laby, Reforming the Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers, 65 BUS. L. 
395 (2009). The Dodd-Frank Act requires the SEC to conduct a study regarding the 
obligations of brokers, dealers, and investment advisers. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §913, 124. Stat. 1376, 1824-30 (2010). 
The comment period expired on August 30, 2010. Study Regarding Obligations of Brokers, 
Dealers, and Investment Advisers, Exchange Act Release No. 62,577, 2010 WL 2927949 
(July 27, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2010/34-62577.pdf.  
21 See infra note 124 and accompanying text. The Senate’s working version of the bill 
did not include a similar provision vesting FINRA with such authority. See infra note 122 
and accompanying text. 
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I. STRUCTURE AND ELEMENTS OF THE SECURITIES 
MARKET 
A. Regulatory Framework of the Industry 
Since their inception in 1790, the securities exchanges have had 
self-governing rules and requirements for listing securities.22 By the time 
the federal government enacted its own securities legislation, there were 
twenty-one such self-governing exchanges.23 The Securities Acts 
represented a compromise, requiring the registration of all national 
exchanges and codifying their self-regulating infrastructure, while 
vesting the SEC with oversight and enforcement powers.24 
1. An Overview of Select Securities Industry Regulation 
Preceding and alongside the federal government’s foray into 
securities and investment regulation, the industry has implemented 
policing procedures of its own.25 These self-regulatory procedures—
once voluntary and now mandatory—are designed to protect investors 
and ensure fair capital markets, thus mirroring the goals of federal 
securities laws.26 Self-regulatory organizations are privately funded 
entities, entrusted with quasi-governmental authority, which generally 
 
22 See Ernest E. Badway & Jonathan M. Busch, Ending Securities Industry Self-
Regulation As We Know It, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 1351, 1352 (2005); Marianne K. Smythe, 
Government Supervised Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry and the Antitrust Laws: 
Suggestions for an Accommodation, 62 N.C. L. REV. 475, 480-81 (1984) (“Much of the 
governance was done by committees appointed by the governing committee. These included 
committees on business conduct, stock list, admission, arrangements, publicity, law, and 
arbitration. . . . [T]he NYSE . . . [had] an impressive infrastructure for regulating the 
activities of its members.”).  
23 See Badway & Busch, supra note 22, at 1352; Smythe, supra note 22, at 480. 
24 See Badway & Busch, supra note 22, at 1353 (“[T]he Exchange Act did not 
completely overhaul the securities industry’s system of ‘self-regulation.’ In fact, the 
Exchange Act codified the self-regulatory structure wanted by these exchanges, but with the 
SEC acting as a watch-dog government agency.”); Smythe, supra note 22, at 481 (“The 
regulatory structure crafted for the securities industry in 1934 was more a function of 
political compromise than of logic.”). 
25 See Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats Into Shares: Causes and Implications of 
Demutualization of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 400 (2002) 
(“[T]he stock exchanges continued to have rulemaking and regulatory authority with respect 
to their members, their trading markets and their listed companies.”). Prior to federal 
regulation, the stock exchanges were uniformly considered to be “private membership 
organizations under state law.” Id.  
26 See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g)-(h) (2006) (requiring SRO compliance with the Exchange 
Act’s rules and regulations to maintain registered status). 
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adopt and enforce these rules to govern member firms.27 SROs count 
among their ranks entities like the NYSE and FINRA, the former being 
one of the first SROs.28 
In response to the stock market crash of 1929 and the subsequent 
crisis of confidence, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933,29 
marking the first federal regulation of securities.30 Shortly after its 
enactment, Congress passed the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,31 
which—in contrast to the Securities Act’s focus on the issuance and 
initial registration of securities— regulates the securities industry and 
the secondary trading of securities.32 The Securities Exchange Act 
created the SEC and vested it with broad authority over the nation’s 
securities markets, including the authority to regulate and supervise 
industry professionals, securities exchanges, and SROs.33 
In 1940, Congress passed the Investment Company Act in response 
to investors’ growing reliance on investment companies for financial 
management.34 The Investment Company Act governs the behaviors of 
 
27 See Friedman, supra note 10, at 737-38; FINRA, supra note 8. For a discussion of the 
quasi-governmental characteristics of SROs, including FINRA, see generally Andrew J. 
Cavo, Note, Weissman v. National Association of Securities Dealers: A Dangerously 
Narrow Interpretation of Absolute Immunity for Self-Regulatory Organizations, 94 
CORNELL L. REV. 415, 417 (2009). 
28 See NYSE, supra note 10; FINRA, supra note 8. 
29 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006). 
30 See Michael Duffy, ‘Fraud on the Market’: Judicial Approaches to Causation and 
Loss from Securities Nondisclosure in the United States, Canada and Australia, 29 MELB. 
U. L. REV. 621, 623 (2005) (“The laws were designed to restore investor confidence in 
capital markets by proscribing certain practices and introducing greater levels of 
government oversight, particularly through the establishment of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.”); Smythe, supra note 22, at 481 (“[T]he long-standing institutions of self-
regulation existed, were still intact, and were forces to be reckoned with in 1934 when 
Congress undertook to devise a new and, it was hoped, more effective structure for the 
regulation of the securities markets.”); SEC, supra note 7. 
31 15 U.S.C. § 78a. 
32 See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (regulating “transactions in securities as commonly conducted 
upon securities exchanges and over-the-counter markets”); SEC, supra note 7 (“With this 
Act, Congress created the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Act empowers the 
SEC with broad authority over all aspects of the securities industry.”).  
33 See 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78z. 
34 See Mark S. Vander Broek, The Demand Requirement in Investment Company Act 
Shareholder Actions, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1500, 1502-03 (1983) (quoting Burks v. Lasker, 
441 U.S. 471, 480-81 (1979)) (“Congress passed the Investment Company Act of 1940 in 
response to concern over ‘the potential for abuse inherent in the structure of investment 
companies’. . . . [and] to prevent abuse of the investment company structure . . . .”).  
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investment companies and requires their registration with the SEC.35 
Similarly, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 regulates the actions of 
investment advisers.36 An investment adviser is defined in the Act as 
“any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising 
others . . . or who . . . as part of a regular business, issues or 
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities . . . .”37 Those 
broker-dealers whose advisory services are solely incidental to their 
work are exempt from the Act’s investment adviser registration.38 
The federal securities laws can be said to have simply added an 
extra layer of regulation over that provided by the exchanges and SROs. 
For instance, the Securities Exchange Act puts the onus on registered 
exchanges to adopt rules designed to “‘prevent fraudulent and 
manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable principles 
of trade,’ and to provide for appropriate discipline of its members for 
any violations of its own rules or the securities laws.”39 Although the 
SEC has gradually gained more authority over SROs by way of 
oversight of their rulemaking and disciplinary proceedings and the 
ability to autonomously enforce SRO member rules,40 the federal 
 
35 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-8(a) (2006) (prescribing registration procedure); 15 U.S.C. 
§ 80a-21 (prohibiting certain insider loans); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-34 (prohibiting certain false 
representations). 
36 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-1-80b-21 (2006). 
37 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11). 
38 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11)(C). 
39 Badway & Busch, supra note 22, at 1353-54 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6)-(7) 
(2000)). The Securities Exchange Act initially provided for only “a limited degree of SEC 
supervision.” NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW & REGULATION § 13.01 (2d ed. 
2001). The over-the-counter market is also within the purview of the Securities Exchange 
Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2006). 
40 See Roberta S. Karmel, Securities Regulation: Should the New York Stock Exchange 
Be Reorganized?, 10/16/2003 N.Y. L.J. 3 (2003); Friedman, supra note 10, at 740-745 
(detailing SROs’ transition from relatively autonomous organizations to strictly regulated 
quasi-governmental entities following the 1975 Securities Reform Act). The Securities 
Reform Act gave “the SEC the power to initiate as well as approve SRO rulemaking, 
expanding the SEC’s role in SRO enforcement and discipline, and allowing the SEC to play 
an active role in structuring the market.” Karmel at 3. See also 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (granting 
the SEC authority to modify SRO rules as it deems necessary); 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)-(f) 
(granting the SEC authority to review and modify SRO disciplinary actions as it deems 
necessary). If an SRO is found not to be in compliance with the provisions of the Securities 
Exchange Act, the SEC has authority to: (1) revoke or suspend the SRO’s registration; (2) 
commence an administrative proceeding against the SRO, to censure or restrict the 
activities, functions, and operations of the organization, a member or an associate; (3) 
remove or censure an officer or director; or (4) enjoin the SRO from an activity which has 
been determined to violate the Securities Exchange Act. See Friedman, supra note 10, at 
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government relies upon the industry’s self-regulation. Rather than 
phasing out or replacing SRO authority with federal oversight, SROs 
have remained an integral part of the market’s regulatory structure, 
recognized by Congress for their “individual commitment to vigilance 
in the surveillance of securities markets.”41 
2. Regulation of Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers 
Among the primary functions of SROs is the regulation of broker-
dealers, serving as intermediaries between the SEC and regulated 
members of the industry.42 A broker is defined as “any person engaged 
in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of 
others,”43 and a dealer as “any person engaged in the business of buying 
and selling securities for such person’s own account.”44 Many firms 
operate as both brokers and dealers. The Securities Exchange Act 
requires broker-dealers to register with the SEC and join either a 
registered national securities exchange or an SRO.45 Broker-dealers are 
statutorily obligated to pay dues to the Securities Investor Protection 
Corporation,46 and are further subject to numerous duties, including 
suitability, best execution, fair dealing, and the prohibition of excessive 
markups and churning of customer accounts.47 Moreover, they are 
 
743 (paraphrasing 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g)-(h)). 
41 See Friedman, supra note 10, at 739. 
42 See FINRA, supra note 8; SEC, supra note 7. 
43 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4)(A). 
44 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(A). 
45 15 U.S.C. § 78o(a)(1) (“It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer . . . to effect any 
transactions in, or to induce or attempt to induce the purchase or sale of, any security . . . 
unless such broker or dealer is registered . . . .”). Nearly all U.S. broker-dealers are members 
of FINRA. See Interim Report, supra note 16, at 119. The requirement for brokers and 
dealers to register as members of a self-regulatory organization was not initially mandated 
under the Exchange Act; amendments to the Act in 1938 under the Maloney Act imposed 
the requirement, resulting in the formation of the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD), now FINRA. See 15 U.S.C. §78o-3; Laby, supra note 20, at 402.  
46 See 15 U.S.C. § 78aaa-lll. The Securities Investor Corporation (“SIPC”) maintains a 
fund to reimburse harmed investors as a result of the failure of a member brokerage firm. Id.  
47 See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1-7(a) (2010) (prohibiting churning and charging 
excessive fees); NASD Rule 2310, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/ 
display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3638 (imposing the standard of suitability for 
customer recommendations); NYSE Rule 405, available at http://rules.nyse.com/ 
NYSETools/PlatformViewer.asp?searched=1&selectednode=chp_1_5_7_6&CiRestriction=
405&manual=/nyse/rules/nyse-rules/; see also Brown v. E.F. Hutton Grp., Inc., 991 F.2d 
1020, 1031 (2d Cir. 1993) (delineating a five-part test required to prove a violation of a 
broker’s standard of suitability). For an expert discussion of broker-dealer duties, see 
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subject to the Exchange Act’s antifraud provisions, as well as financial 
soundness regulations set by the SEC.48 Thus, broker-dealers are subject 
to layers of rules-based regulation, allowing for both SRO and SEC 
oversight and discipline. 
SRO jurisdiction is limited to brokers and dealers, leaving a 
regulatory gap with regard to investment advisers.49 Investment advisers, 
therefore, remain somewhat of an anomaly in the securities regulation 
framework, in that they are subject only to either SEC or state oversight 
pursuant to the Investment Advisers Act.50 In general, an investment 
adviser is required to register with the SEC if he manages more than 
$100 million in assets.51 Below that asset threshold, the Investment 
Advisers Act precludes federal regulation, allowing the state to assume 
the responsibility if registration is required at all.52 Otherwise, the 
 
generally DAVID A. LIPTON, BROKER-DEALER REGULATION §§ 5:1 – 5:29 (2007). 
48 See 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5 (prohibiting any act or omission resulting in fraud or deceit 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security); 17 C.F.R. 240.17a-5(c) (2010) 
(requiring filing and disclosure of certain financial statements). 
49 See Carolyn W. Mendelson, Wasn’t My Broker Always Looking Out for My Best 
Interests? The Road to Become a Fiduciary, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 41, 48 (2009); see also 15 
U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (requiring only broker-dealers to maintain SRO membership); Mary L. 
Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address Before the New York Financial 
Writers’ Association Annual Awards Dinner (June 18, 2009), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch061809mls-2.htm (discussing the disparate 
regulatory framework of broker-dealers and investment advisers); Doug Halonen, Madoff 
Scandal Spurs SRO Talk, Pensions & Investments, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Jan. 12, 
2009, 12:01 AM), http://www.pionline.com/article/20090112/PRINTSUB/901109970 
(discussing the fact that registered investment advisers are not subject to SRO oversight).  
50 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2006) (prescribing thresholds for state and federal 
registration). Individual and institutional investors alike retain investment advisers to assist 
them in the planning of their financial affairs. See Background & Mission, INVESTMENT 
ADVISER ASS’N, https://www.investmentadviser.org/eweb/dynamicpage.aspx?webcode= 
BackgroundMission (last visited Oct. 21, 2010) (“Today, the IAA consists of more than 
475 firms that manage assets for a wide variety of institutional and individual clients, 
including pension plans, trusts, investment companies, endowments, foundations, and 
corporations.”).  
51 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a (prohibiting investment advisers from registering with the 
SEC unless they manage at least $100 million in assets). As of April 2009, there were 
11,257 registered investment advisers. See Inv. Adviser Ass’n. & Nat’l. Regulatory Servs., 
Evolution Revolution 2009: A Profile of the Investment Advisory Profession, INVESTMENT 
ADVISER ASS’N, https://www.investmentadviser.org/eweb/docs/Publications_News/Reports 
_and_Brochures/IAA-NRS_Evolution_Revolution_Reports/evolution_revolution_2009.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 21, 2010). Before the Dodd-Frank Act, the asset threshold was $25 million. 
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 
410, 124 Stat. 1376, 1576-77; Kara Scannell, States Will Be Hedge-Fund Police, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 19, 2010, at C3. 
52 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a (requiring federal registration unless assets under 
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Investment Advisers Act is largely principles-based. That is, the Act’s 
prohibition of any registered investment adviser to “employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective client,” to 
engage in “any transaction, practice, or course of business which 
operates as a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client,” and 
to engage in principal trades without the client’s consent,53 relies on the 
fact that registered investment advisers owe a fiduciary duty to their 
clients. This fiduciary duty imposes subjective requirements on 
investment advisers to avoid conflicts of interest with their clients in 
order to act in their clients’ best interests.54 As such, an effective 
investment adviser undertakes to gain a thorough understanding of the 
client’s resources, risk tolerance, and investment goals in order to make 
appropriate recommendations.55 Thus, this principles-based framework 
permits clients and firms to define the scope of their relationship, in that 
clients may consent to existing conflicts of interest with their 
investment adviser.56 
B. Trust as an Essential Element of the Economy 
Trust can be defined as “the voluntary ceding of control over 
 
management amount to less than $100 million). 
53 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6. 
54 See Lori A. Richards, Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, 
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Fiduciary Duty: Return to First Principles (Feb. 27, 2006), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch022706lar.htm; Mendelson, supra note 
49, at 48-49. Although the term “fiduciary duty” is not used in the Investment Advisers Act, 
courts have found the duty to be inherent. See Mendelson, supra note 49, at 49 (citing SEC 
v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963)). The Supreme Court stated 
that: 
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a congressional recognition 
of the delicate fiduciary nature of an investment advisory relationship, as well 
as a congressional intent to eliminate, or at least expose, all conflicts of interest 
which might incline an investment adviser—consciously or unconsciously—to 
render advice which was not disinterested. 
Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 191-92. See also Jessica Holzer & Fawn Johnson, Brokers, 
Critics Spar Over ‘Fiduciary’ Rule, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2010, at C15 (“Fiduciary duty for 
investment advisers has never been strictly defined in the law. Court rulings and SEC 
enforcement actions have provided guidelines. One is that advisers should provide clear 
disclosure so clients can compare advisers’ disciplinary history and pay arrangements.”). 
55 See IAA Standards of Practice, INVESTMENT ADVISER ASS’N, https://www.investment 
adviser.org/eweb/dynamicpage.aspx?webcode=StandardsPractice (last visited Oct. 21, 
2010) (describing registered investment adviser standards of practice). 
56 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(3) (requiring a registered investment adviser to disclose any 
conflicts of interest and obtain client consent before making certain transactions in 
securities). 
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something valuable to another person or entity, based upon one’s faith 
in the ability and willingness of that person or entity to care for the 
valuable thing.”57 Simply put, trust is having faith and believing in 
others. Trust’s corollary, trustworthiness, can be defined as an 
“unwillingness to exploit a trusting person’s vulnerability even when 
external rewards favor doing so.”58 Trustworthiness is displayed through 
an individual or entity’s integrity and fulfillment of assigned 
responsibilities. 
The concept of trust has always been an essential element of our 
economy.59 Research has shown that cooperative, trustworthy behavior 
between individuals leads to more of the same behavior and an increase 
in the perception of trust between the individuals.60 Research has also 
shown that, among individuals, “communications and expressions 
directed towards encouraging cooperative behavior lead to greater 
trustworthiness.”61 Building on this behavioral foundation, research has 
found that on an individual level, trust plays an integral part of 
economic interaction.62 That is, “[t]rust acts as a lubricant,”63 enabling 
individuals, as investors, to transact efficiently, and thus, more often. 
For analogous reasons, the proper organizational regime can similarly 
promote trust among individuals. In other words, “[when] people are 
confident in the [law] to punish cheating, people are more trusting”64 as 
a result of their faith in the monitoring system. 
 
57 Raymond H. Brescia, Trust in the Shadows: Law, Behavior, and Financial Re-
Regulation, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1361, 1369 (2009) (quoting Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 
GEO. L.J. 1457, 1461 (2005)). See also MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 432 
(11th ed. 2003) (defining the term “trust” as “assured reliance on the character, ability, 
strength, or truth of someone or something.”). 
58 Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral 
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1740 (2001). See also MERRIAM-
WEBSTER, supra note 57 (defining the term “trustworthy” as “worthy of confidence.”). 
59 See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Gifts and Exchanges, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 343, 357 
(1972); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REV. 591, 596 
(2001); Brescia, supra note 57, at 1366 (quoting 1 JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF 
POLITICAL ECONOMY ch. VII, § 5, at 108-09 (Cosimo 2006) (1848)). 
60 See, e.g., Thomas Gautschi, History Effects in Social Dilemma Situations, 12 
RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 131 (2000); Nina Mazar, On Amir & Dan Ariely, The Dishonesty of 
Honest People: A Theory of Self-Concept Maintenance, 45 J. MARKETING RES. 633 (2008); 
Brescia, supra note 57, at 1397-1400. 
61 Brescia, supra note 57, at 1397. 
62 See id. at 1363. 
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 1402. 
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These observations have been tested and applied in the context of 
financial reform. One general conclusion is that “[j]ust as the level of 
trust present in a society generally has a positive impact on growth, 
nations that have strong investor protections, and which honor the rule 
of law and contract and property rights, tend to have higher rates of 
economic growth than low trust/weak rule of law nations.”65 The idea of 
trust has been commonly measured by the World Values Survey, which 
asks citizens of a given country whether they generally trust others.66 In 
his survey of the subject and underlying research, Frank B. Cross details 
the association between trust and economic growth.67 Using the World 
Values Survey data, Cross established a significant and positive 
association between trust and economic growth.68 A similar study 
looked at twenty-nine market economies and found a significant and 
positive association between trust and both investment and economic 
growth.69 Another study found a positive link between high levels of 
trust and higher economic growth rates.70 Thus, Cross and others have 
found that, to a large extent, “[t]rust itself is critical to economic 
success,”
71
 due to its ability to temper economic uncertainty. 
History tells a similar story. It was the public’s loss of trust that 
acted as a catalyst for comprehensive securities regulation beyond that 
provided by the self-regulating arm of the industry.72 In response to the 
rising prevalence of fraud and highly speculative and unfair investments 
that were unlisted on exchanges,73 various states enacted “blue-sky” 
laws for the purpose of imposing registration requirements on securities 
and their salesmen.74 Within just two decades, all but one state had 
 
65 Id. at 1405. 
66 See Rafael La Porta et al., Trust in Large Organizations, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 333, 
334-35 (1997). 
67 See Cross, supra note 57, at 1475-85. 
68 See Cross, supra note 57, at 1479 (citing La Porta, supra note 66, at 334-35). 
69 See Cross, supra note 57, at 1478 (citing Stephen Knack & Phillip Keefer, Does 
Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff?, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1251 (1997)). 
70 See Cross, supra note 57, at 1478 (citing Paul F. Whitely, Economic Growth and 
Social Capital, 48 POL. STUD. 443, 444-52, 460 (2000)). 
71 See id. 
72 See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text; infra note 77 and accompanying text. 
73 See LOUIS LOSS & EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 7 n.22 (1958); Jonathan R. 
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 353-54 
(1991); Paul G. Mahoney, The Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of Competing 
Hypotheses, 46 J.L. & ECON. 229 (2003). 
74 See Mahoney, supra note 73, at 229-231. In 1911, Kansas became the first state to 
adopt a statute regulating the sale of securities. Id. The term “blue-sky” is said to have 
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enacted blue-sky laws.75 The public had come to perceive the exchanges 
as untrustworthy, blaming them for facilitating the fraudulent and 
speculative investments characteristic of those in the early twentieth 
century leading up to the market crash of 1929.76 
Following the crash, the public’s trust in the nation’s securities 
markets continued to fall precipitously.77 Small and large investors alike 
were wary throughout the ensuing Great Depression of reinvesting any 
money they had salvaged.78 As Congress and the Roosevelt 
administration explored methods of financial recovery, it became clear 
that the public’s confidence in the markets would first have to be 
restored.79 The Roosevelt administration’s response included an attempt 
to garner trust through the use of the Blue Eagle symbol,80 which sought 
to symbolize compliance with codes of conduct.81 The Blue Eagle was 
marketed by complying companies across all industries to show 
consumers that they were trustworthy.82 Companies that complied with 
the requirements of the program were authorized to display a Blue 
Eagle decal to their employees and to the public, symbolizing their 
devotion to the nation’s recovery and signifying that they were “a 
 
derived from one individual’s disparaging characterization of securities salesmen of the day, 
who would sell “building lots in the blue sky.” Id. (quoting LOSS & COWETT, supra note 73, 
at 7 n.22). See also Thomas Mulvey, Blue Sky Law, 36 CAN. L. TIMES 37, 37 (1916). 
75 See Mahoney, supra note 73, at 229. By 1931, 47 of the 48 existing states had 
adopted such laws. Id. 
76 See Badway & Busch, supra note 22, at 1353. Congressman Adolph Sabath, on the 
floor of the House of Representatives, argued that the securities exchanges: 
[B]elieve[d] that it [was] their own privilege and their God-given right to 
control this gambling den that brought about destruction to America, brought 
about the closing of our banks and manufacturing plants, nearly ruined all of the 
insurance companies, brought about the unemployment of 16,000,000 men in 
the United States and that caused untold hardships and suffering and, above all, 
that was responsible for thousands of suicidal deaths. 
Id. (quoting 78 CONG. REC. 7689 (1934)). 
77 See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 1. In the immediate aftermath of the Crash of ‘29, 
investor confidence was at such a low that federal intervention, a first in the securities 
markets, was needed. Id.  
78 See SEC, supra note 7; Duffy, supra note 30, at 623 (“During the 1920s 
approximately 20 million large and small shareholders purchased securities on the United 
States stock market, with some $50 billion in new securities offered during this period. 
Following the stock market crash of October 1929, it is estimated that approximately half of 
the $50 billion became worthless.”).  
79 See Duffy supra note 30, at 623; Hunter, supra note 1, at 643. 
80 See Brescia, supra note 57, at 1361-62. 
81 See id. at 1361. 
82 See id. at 1361-62. 
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business worthy of consumer trust.”83 Thus, the Blue Eagle symbol 
acted not only to cull the individual consumer’s confidence in the 
regulatory system, but to ensure the consumer of the organization’s 
trustworthiness.84 
These examples illustrate the predominant role of trust in economic 
transactions and recovery.85 Additionally, they convey the importance of 
analyzing trust via the perception of the individual consumer.86 
Although the underlying concept is intuitive, it demonstrates our 
regulatory framework’s unique potential to reestablish investor 
confidence. 
C. Investigation and Enforcement 
1. SRO Regulatory Tools 
The authority granted to FINRA under the Exchange Act allows it 
to be an effective intermediary between the SEC and its registered 
broker-dealers. While the SEC does not have the general authority to 
adopt rules governing the conduct of registered broker-dealers in 
relation to their customers,87 FINRA, and other SROs like it, require 
their members to adopt rules of conduct and to retain the power to 
enforce these rules (and other supervisory policies and procedures) 
using designated enforcement and examination staff.88 Among the 
requirements FINRA imposes on its members are those which mirror 
the general anti-fraud prohibitions under the Securities Acts,89 as well as 
those which govern treatment of customer accounts.90 Further, FINRA’s 
 
83 See id. at 1361. 
84 See id. at 1361-62. 
85 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
86 See supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text. 
87 See id. Instead, SROs are required to enforce SEC and SRO rules. See Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g) (2006) (“Every self-regulatory organization shall 
comply with the provisions of this title…the rules and regulations thereunder, and its own 
rules . . . .”). 
88 See e.g., Hunter, supra note 1, at 646-47 (citing About NYSE Regulation, NYSE 
EURONEXT, http://www.nyse.com/regulation/nyse/1045516499685.html#mktsur (last visited 
Oct. 16, 2010)).  
89 Compare FINRA Rule 2020, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/ 
display/display.html?rbid=2403&record_id=6914&element_id=5513&highlight=2020#r691
4 (prohibiting fraudulent and manipulative devices), with SEC General Rules and 
Regulations, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993) (prohibiting employment of “any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud”).  
90 See FINRA Rule 2060, available at http://finra.complinet.com/en/ 
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Supervision Rule requires member firms to “establish, implement and 
enforce a supervisory system reasonably designed to achieve 
compliance with securities laws and regulations.”91 
SROs are able to succeed in part because of their unique 
investigative and enforcement processes. Within this self-regulatory 
regime exists a broad jurisdictional mandate to discipline fraudulent 
acts, unethical conduct, the inadequate supervision of accounts, the 
failure to maintain books and records, and violations of any provision of 
the Exchange Act or any rule or regulation pursuant thereto.92 
Additionally, “virtually any underlying act or omission disciplinable by 
one SRO is disciplinable by any other SRO.”93 Because all brokerage 
firms belong to at least one SRO, and most belong to several, regulators 
have the opportunity to oversee broker-dealers with a fine-tooth comb, 
which stands in stark contrast to the SEC’s relatively limited oversight 
of registered investment advisers.94 For example, FINRA conducted 
approximately 2500 examinations of its 4900 registered broker-dealer 
firms in 2008, whereas the SEC conducted fewer than 1500 
examinations of its 11,300 registered investment advisers in 2007.95 
Moreover, these privately funded, quasi-governmental 
organizations are not constrained by constitutional mandates to the same 
extent as the SEC.96 For instance, although registered broker-dealers 
have a duty to cooperate with SRO investigations, they are not entitled 
 
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=8849 (prescribing proper usage of 
information obtained in a fiduciary capacity); supra note 47. 
91 William Jannace & Anita Moore, Overview of SRO and Broker/Dealer Regulation, 
1748 PLI/CORP 31, 38 (2009); see also FINRA Rule 3130, available at 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=6286 
(requiring annual certification of compliance and supervisory processes). 
92 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6)-(7) (requiring SROs to 
“prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices [and] to promote just and equitable 
principles of trade . . . .”); Badway & Busch, supra note 22, at 1353-55.  
93 Joan F. Berger et al., A Dialogue with Securities Industry—Self-Regulators: 
Disciplinary Investigations and Proceedings Conducted by the American Stock Exchange, 
the National Association of Securities Dealers, and the New York Stock Exchange, 501 
PLI/CORP 359, 361 (1985).  
94 See id. at 363 (“SROs have a large common membership, all those subject to SRO 
jurisdiction must realize that they are subject to multiple, sometimes co-extensive subject 
matter jurisdiction.”). 
95 See Ketchum, supra note 18; see also Scannell, supra note 51 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (“Over 3,000 investment advisers have never been examined by the SEC.”).  
96 See Badway & Busch, supra note 22, at 1356-58 (describing due process obligations 
of SROs). 
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to invoke their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.97 
Nor does the commencement of an SRO investigation require a formal 
order of the kind required by the SEC.98 Further, despite not possessing 
the SEC’s subpoena power, SROs can compel a broker-dealer’s 
cooperation in an investigation through a range of available sanctions, 
including expulsion, barring employment with a member organization, 
suspension, or a fine.99 As such, industry incentives including the 
preservation of reputation and avoidance of the imposition of fines have 
helped SROs regulate member conduct as effectively as—and with 
greater efficiency than—the SEC. 
2. Recent Missteps in SEC Enforcement 
Despite the SEC’s zeal and overall effectiveness as an enforcement 
agency, recent fraud reveals regulatory deficiencies currently facing the 
securities industry.100 Two separate, high-profile cases involving 
businesses owned by financiers Bernard Madoff and R. Allen Stanford 
highlight these deficiencies. 
Bernard Madoff was the sole owner of registered broker-dealer and 
investment adviser firm Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC 
(hereinafter “BMIS”).101 BMIS’ business was comprised of proprietary 
trading, market making, and investment adviser services.102 Madoff 
conducted the investment adviser wing of BMIS separately from its 
other activities, even locating the wing on a different floor of the BMIS 
office building.103 From the 1990s until 2008, BMIS operated an 
estimated $50 billion Ponzi scheme that paid old clients with the 
principal of new clients’ investments in order to give the appearance of 
 
97 See Badway & Busch, supra note 22, at 1356-58 (citing NASD Rule 8221(b), 
8310(b); NYSE Disciplinary Rules 476, 477). 
98 See Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis LLP, Enforcement by Self-Regulatory 
Organizations, in THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL, TACTICS AND STRATEGIES 473, 
483 (2007). 
99 See Berger et al., supra note 93, at 376-77.  
100 The SEC has borne its share of criticism. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, SEC Workers 
Investigated for Porn-Surfing, WASHINGTON TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, http://www. 
washingtontimes.com/news/2010/feb/02/sec-workers-investigated-for-viewing-porn-at-
work/?feat=home_headlines (describing salacious work habits of some libertine SEC 
employees).. To be sure, the agency’s daily efforts go relatively unnoticed. 
101 See Complaint at 4, United States v. Madoff, 586 F. Supp.2d 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(No. 08 Mag. 2735).    
102 See id.  
103 See id. at 4-5. 
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legitimate returns.104 Not a single investment was made, making the 
entire operation a fraud.105 In fact, no regulatory agency can take the 
credit for cracking the Madoff case—his sons turned him in upon 
learning of the scheme.106 
What is probably the most dismaying aspect of the entire scam is 
that the SEC had investigated Madoff’s activities eight times during a 
period of sixteen years, without ever making an enforcement 
recommendation.107 The SEC had been warned on several occasions that 
BMIS’ investment advisory arm was producing impossibly favorable 
results.108 Further, one SEC staffer had noticed a red flag and warned 
superiors of irregularities at BMIS, but was directed to overlook the 
matter.109 Because Madoff’s asset management business was registered 
as an investment adviser with the SEC, that agency had sole regulatory 
jurisdiction over the fraud-perpetrating arm of BMIS under the 
Investment Advisers Act of 1940.110 As such, although FINRA had 
access to BMIS’ broker-dealer operations, which it had investigated in 
 
104 See id. at 1-2. 
105 See id.; David Ellis, Congress Looks for Answers in Madoff Scandal, CNNMONEY 
(Jan. 5, 2009), http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/05/news/companies/madoff_hearing/index 
.htm. 
106 See, e.g., David Voreacos & David Glovin, Madoff Turned in by Sons After 
Confessing $50 Billion Fraud, BLOOMBERG.COM (Dec. 12, 2008), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aDekXqQt6w7o. 
107 See Kara Scannell, Madoff Chasers Dug for Years, to No Avail, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 
2009, at C1; Bhargava, supra note 20, at 911; Scannell, supra note 51 (“The SEC inspected 
Bernard Madoff’s operations several times, and eventually made him register as an 
investment adviser, but never figured out he was running a multibillion-dollar Ponzi 
scheme.”); see also Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr., Why Government Regulation Fails, WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 20, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487045089045751 
92430373566758.html (“Financial services regulators failed to enforce laws and regulations 
against fraud. Bernie Madoff is the paradigmatic case and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission the paradigmatic failed regulator. Fraud is famously difficult to uncover, but as 
we now know, not Madoff’s.”). 
108 See Bhargava, supra note 20, at 911 (“Investment banker Harry Markopolos had 
warned the SEC during the six years prior to BMIS’s collapse that the company was 
reporting impossible returns.”); Kara Scannell, Liz Rappaport, & Thomas Catan, SEC 
Blasted on Goldman, WALL ST. J., September 23, 2010, at A1.  
109 See Zachary Goldfarb, Staffer at SEC Had Warned of Madoff, WASH. POST, July 2, 
2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/07/01/AR200907010 
4223.html. Genevievette Walker-Lightfoot, a staffer in the Office of Compliance 
Investigations and Examinations, found irregularities in the firm’s responses to a review she 
conducted. Id. Walker-Lightfoot drafted a set of questions to ask the firm, directed at 
matters which later turned out to be elements of the fraud. Id. However, the questions were 
never asked. Id. 
110 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41(a) (2006); Bhargava, supra note 20, at 911.  
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the past, it was statutorily prohibited from concerning itself with BMIS’ 
investment advisory activities.111 Although it is impossible to know 
whether the fraud would have been discovered if FINRA had access to 
BMIS’ investment advisory arm, the Madoff scheme raises questions as 
to the efficacy of the SEC as the sole regulator of investment advisers. 
Within months of the discovery of Madoff’s fraud, the SEC 
uncovered an unrelated fraud perpetrated by R. Allen Stanford.112 
Stanford was chairman of the privately held, wholly-owned Stanford 
Financial Group.113 In February 2009, the SEC charged Stanford with 
fraud, alleging that he promised investors above-market returns on 
certificates of deposit issued by the Group’s Stanford International 
Bank, all while running a Ponzi scheme which ultimately cheated 
investors out of $7 billion.114 Reminiscent of the SEC’s missed 
opportunities in the Madoff fraud, it has recently come to light that the 
SEC similarly overlooked red flags raised by Stanford’s dealings.115 A 
report issued by the SEC’s inspector general states that “SEC examiners 
concluded four times between 1997 and 2004 that Mr. Stanford’s 
businesses were fraudulent, but each time decided not to go further.”116 
Moreover, in similar fashion to its treatment of the warnings of the 
Madoff fraud, the SEC dismissed warnings in 2003 from insiders at the 
Stanford Group, as well as warnings in a letter from the NASD—
FINRA’s predecessor—which stated that the “Stanford businesses ‘will 
destroy the life savings of many.’”117 The SEC’s alleged investigatory 
 
111 See Rachelle Younglai, FINRA Defends Its Role in Madoff Scandal, REUTERS (Jan. 
14, 2009), http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE50E0EQ20090115; Scannell, 
supra note 108 (noting that FINRA maintains that it was statutorily unable to investigate the 
BMIS fraud). 
112 See Michael R. Crittenden & Kara Scannell, Report Says SEC Missed Many Shots at 
Stanford, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052 
702303491304575188220570802084.html?mod=WSJ_latestheadlines. 
113 See Kara Scannell, Miguel Bustillo & Evan Perez, SEC Accuses Texas Financier of 
‘Massive’ $8 Billion Fraud, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB123489015427300943.html.  
114 See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges R. Allen Stanford, 
Stanford International Bank for Multi-Billion Dollar Investment Scheme (Feb. 17, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-26.htm; Crittenden & Scannell, 
supra note 112.  
115 See Crittenden & Scannell, supra note 112. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. (citing U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n Office of Inspector Gen., Investigation of the 
SEC’s Response to Concerns Regarding Robert Allen Stanford’s Alleged Ponzi Scheme 
(Mar. 31, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/oig-526.pdf); see also 
Faith Stevelman, Globalization and Corporate Social Responsibility: Challenges for the 
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lapse thus draws attention to possible institutional shortcomings. 
II. FEDERAL REACTION: THE FINRA DEBATE 
In response to the crisis, scandals, and subsequent plunge in 
investor confidence, and fueled by the Administration’s anti-Wall Street 
rhetoric,118 the wheels of Congress have turned. Legislation aiming to 
reform the financial services industry has been passed and signed into 
law. Although the legislation addresses the future of investment adviser 
regulation, Congress’ response is tepid, at best. 
A. Legislation and the SEC’s Specialized Enforcement Units 
In 2009, the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was 
introduced in the House of Representatives.119 The Act included a 
provision that extended FINRA’s oversight authority to investment 
advisers, similar to that which it exercises over broker-dealers.120 The 
provision’s sponsor, Representative Spencer Baucus, explained that the 
provision was intended to close the regulatory gaps exposed during the 
Madoff investigation and scandal, because despite visits to BMIS by 
both FINRA and the SEC, those agencies examined separate groups of 
employees and missed a $50 billion Ponzi scheme.121 Similarly, the 
Senate’s working version of the bill required a study that would focus 
on the differences between the regulatory practices and effectiveness of 
FINRA and the SEC, with an eye toward the possibility of creating an 
SRO to oversee investment advisers. 122 
 
Academy, Future Lawyers, and Corporate Law, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 817, 832 n.65 
(2009) (“The SEC itself has gone on record with the observation that Stanford’s bank 
promised improbable, if not impossible returns to investors, which certainly raises questions 
about why the SEC did not act sooner.”). 
118 See, e.g., Kimberly A. Strassel, Bonfire of the Populists, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704878904575031640091592622.html. In 
his 2010 State of the Union address, President Obama lambasted “bad behavior on Wall 
Street,” “‘selfish’ bankers [and] CEOs who ‘reward’ themselves ‘for failure’.” Id. (Barack 
Obama, President, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2010)). 
119 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124. Stat. 1376 (2010). 
120 See House Passes Wall Street Reform Legislation, supra note 20 (“The Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act had a provision that would have given [FINRA] 
‘sweeping rule-making authority’” over registered investment advisers.). 
121 See id.; discussion supra Part I.C.2. 
122 See S. 3217, 111th Cong. § 913 (2010). As initially filed, the provision 
[Directed] the SEC to conduct a study of the effectiveness of existing legal or 
regulatory standards of care for brokers, dealers, and investment advisers for 
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However, the aforementioned provisions were eliminated before 
the Dodd-Frank Act’s passage.123 Instead, all that remains are provisions 
requiring the SEC to study both the investment adviser examinations it 
has conducted over the past five years and the extent to which SRO 
regulation could result in more frequent investment adviser 
examinations.124 The Dodd-Frank Act also requires a study of the SEC’s 
institutional organization.125 The study will consider the possibility of 
eliminating units within the Commission and whether the SEC’s current 
level of reliance on SROs is appropriate.126 Further, included are 
provisions that allow the SEC to write new rules imposing an across-
the-board standard of conduct on brokers, dealers, and investment 
advisers in their capacities as client representatives.127 The standard of 
conduct would essentially create a fiduciary duty, in that they would 
have “to act in the best interest of the customer without regard” to their 
own financial interest.128 Although registered investment advisers are 
already held to a fiduciary standard,129 such a duty would be new for 
broker-dealers.130 
Amidst the legislative debate, the SEC undertook a reorganization 
of its Division of Enforcement.131 The Commission established five 
specialized units—Asset Management, Market Abuse, Structured and 
New Products, Foreign Corrupt Practices, and Municipal Securities and 
 
providing personalized investment advice and recommendations about 
securities to retail customers imposed by the SEC and FINRA, and whether 
there are legal or regulatory gaps or overlap in legal or regulatory standards in 
the protection of retail customers. The section also requires the SEC to issue a 
report within one year that considers public input. If the study identifies any 
gaps or overlap in the legal or regulatory standards in the protection of retail 
customers relating to the standards of care for brokers, dealers, and investment 
advisers, the SEC shall commence a rulemaking within two years to address 
such regulatory gaps and overlap that can be addressed by rule. 
S. Rep. No. 111-176, at 105 (2010). 
123 See House Passes Wall Street Reform Legislation, supra note 20. 
124 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 914(a) 
125 Id. at § 967(a). 
126 See id. 
127 Id. at § 913(f)-(g). 
128 Id. at § 913(g). 
129 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006) (prescribing fiduciary duties of IAs owed to clients). 
130 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2006) (prescribing registration requirements and standards of 
conduct for brokers, which currently do not include fiduciary duties). 
131 See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Names New Specialized Unit 
Chiefs and Head of New Office of Market Intelligence (Jan. 13, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-5.htm.  
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Public Pensions—and created a new Office of Market Intelligence.132 
The goal of these specialized units is to make investigations more 
targeted and efficient, while the Office of Market Intelligence is tasked 
with monitoring, collecting, and analyzing referrals and tips received by 
the SEC.133 This comprehensive reorganization, nothing short of a 
reaction to the Madoff and Stanford scandals, is an attempt to fill the 
gaps in federal investment adviser oversight. 
B. Support for FINRA’s Role 
FINRA has lobbied extensively for the authority to oversee 
investment advisers.134 It points to the fact that the current system 
regulates financial professionals who effectively perform many of the 
same services pursuant to inconsistent standards.135 It further cites the 
fact that its Board of Governors is comprised of a majority of non-
industry representatives,136 thus distancing itself from claims that its 
interests are too closely aligned with those of the industry professionals 
it would attempt to oversee. FINRA argues that its position as the first 
line of defense for customers of broker-dealers would also allow it to 
fulfill that role for customers of investment advisers.137 Specifically, 
FINRA argues that consistent and frequent exams are needed to effect 
proper oversight of all financial professionals, which the SEC simply 
cannot provide, and has not provided, in light of the disparate ratio of 
 
132 See id.  
133 See id. (“These units and the new office will help provide the additional structure, 
resources, and expertise necessary for enforcement staff to keep pace with ever-changing 
markets and more comprehensively investigate cases involving complex products, markets, 
regulatory regimes, practices and transactions.”). 
134 See Ketchum, supra note 18. Specifically, FINRA has advocated for the following 
protections:  
[E]very person who provides financial advice and sells a financial product 
should be tested, qualified and licensed; the advertising for financial products 
and services should be subject to requirements that it is not misleading; every 
product marketed to a particular investor is appropriate for recommendation to 
that investor; and there should be full and comprehensive disclosure for the 
services and products being marketed. 
Id.  
135 See id. (“Our current system of financial regulation leads to an environment where 
investors are left without consistent and effective protections when dealing with financial 
professionals.”). 
136 See id. 
137 See id. 
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registered investment advisers to SEC staff examiners.138 Finally, 
FINRA highlights its statutory inability to have examined BMIS’ 
investment advisory arm under the current regulatory regime, which, it 
has said, allowed BMIS to “cynically game the system . . . at great harm 
to investors.”139 In sum, FINRA contends that allowing for combined 
broker-dealer and investment adviser oversight authority would give the 
regulator “a complete picture of the business,”140 ultimately benefitting 
the investor. 
Support for FINRA’s investment adviser oversight authority also 
exists elsewhere. SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro has recognized that 
there is no functional difference between professional investment 
adviser and broker-dealer operations and services.141 Similarly, a widely-
cited study, the “RAND Report,” concluded that despite the stark 
regulatory contrast between investment advisers and broker-dealers, the 
typical investor does not understand the difference between the two 
professions.142 Most telling, the study reported that investors felt that 
 
138 See id. Ketchum stated: 
Consider the contrast: FINRA oversees nearly 4,900 broker-dealer firms and 
conducts approximately 2,500 regular exams each year. The SEC oversees more 
than 11,000 investment advisers, but in 2007 conducted fewer than 1,500 exams 
of those firms. The SEC has said recently that in some cases, a decade could 
pass without an examination of an investment adviser firm. 
Id. 
139 Id. 
140 Ketchum, supra note 18. 
141 See Schapiro, supra note 49 (discussing broker-dealers’ and investment advisers’ 
convergence of practice); see also Elisse B. Walter, Comm’r, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, 
Speech at the Manual Fund Directors Forum Ninth Annual Policy Conference: Regulating 
Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers: Demarcation or Harmonization? (May 5, 2009), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch050509ebw.htm (stating that 
investment advisers and broker-dealers “provide practically indistinguishable services to 
retail investors.”). 
142 See ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., RAND REPORT: INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY 
PERSPECTIVES ON INVESTMENTS AND BROKER-DEALERS 14 (2008) (concluding from survey 
data that many investors are unaware of the differences between broker-dealers and 
investment advisers); see also Richard F. Jackson, James E. Anderson & Andre E. Owens, 
SEC Publishes RAND Report on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers, WILMERHALE 
(Feb. 7, 2008), http://www.wilmerhale.com/publications/whPubsDetail.aspx?publication 
=8226. The RAND Report concluded that: 
[R]etail investors generally had difficulty understanding the distinctions 
between investment advisers and broker-dealers, including their duties, the titles 
they use, the services they offer, and the fees they pay for those services. RAND 
also found that investors had difficulty distinguishing between investment 
advisers and broker-dealers and understanding the varying affiliations and other 
relationships among the different firms. 
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investment advisers and broker-dealers should be similarly regulated.143 
Proponents view such investor confusion as a compelling rationale for 
bringing those industry professionals under the umbrella of one SRO 
and subjecting them to similar rules and standards.144 Further, 
proponents contend that a rules-based standard of care—one FINRA is 
already equipped to enforce—would make enforcement that much 
easier, as there would be little need for the interpretation of principles-
based fiduciary standards, and examination methods could be 
implemented readily and efficiently.145 Subjecting investment advisers to 
requirements similar to those of broker-dealers would necessarily entail 
more thorough oversight, including licensing, filing, and recordkeeping 
requirements; this would be a positive outcome from an investor 
protection perspective according to proponents of these changes.146 
The proposition of subjecting investment advisers to oversight 
similar to that governing broker-dealers has received government 
approval. In 2008, the Treasury issued the Blueprint for a Modernized 
Financial Regulatory Structure report, which focused on the “rapid and 
continued convergence”147 of the broker-dealer and investment adviser 
professions and the “resulting regulatory confusion”148 of investors. The 
report ultimately recommended the self-regulation of the investment 
adviser industry similar to that of broker-dealers.149 The Blueprint 
Report cited the cost-effectiveness and potential for enhanced investor 
 
Id. 
143 See HUNG ET AL., supra note 142, at 20. 
144 See Jackson et al., supra note 142. 
145 See Bhargava, supra note 20, at 908-17 (arguing for the harmonization of broker-
dealer and investment adviser standards of care); Interim Report, supra note 16, at 122-25. 
146 See 15 U.S.C. § 78o (2006) (prescribing registration requirements and other 
obligations of brokers and dealers). In 2008 the Department of Treasury released a report 
discussing these issues:  
Whereas government regulators are mainly focused on antifraud enforcement, 
SROs can adopt and amend industry rules that address a wider range of activity 
and professional conduct. As private bodies, SROs may adopt rules and aspire 
to standards that extend beyond statutory or regulatory requirements while at 
the same time maintaining a flexibility that can help to better protect investors 
and encourage innovation in the offering of financial services and products. 
DEP’T OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE 
122 (2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf 
[hereinafter BLUEPRINT REPORT]. 
147 See BLUEPRINT REPORT, supra note 146, at 125.  
148 Id.  
149 See id. at 125-26.  
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protection as compelling reasons for reform.150 
Finally, rather than focusing on the perceived benefits of SRO 
investment adviser oversight authority, some proponents simply point to 
current regulatory deficiencies, including the SEC’s sheer lack of 
manpower to effectively oversee its registered investment advisers, as 
evidence that organizational reform is needed.151 
C. Criticism of FINRA’s Role 
Conversely, the investment adviser industry generally opposes 
altering the current industry oversight standards and regime.152 These 
organizations primarily argue that FINRA’s rules-based standards are 
incompatible with the fiduciary duties inherently owed by registered 
investment advisers to their customers.153 These opponents contend that 
the fiduciary duty of an investment adviser qualifies as the highest 
standard applicable to any financial services professional, thus 
providing investors with the greatest protections against misconduct.154 
As such, they assert, other standards of conduct are simply insufficient 
for an investment adviser’s line of work.155 
Aside from the insufficiency of a rules-based standard of care, 
opponents argue that combining broker-dealer and investment adviser 
oversight would further blur the line between the professions, thus 
doing a disservice to investors by confusing them.156 Such blurring of the 
 
150 See id. at 126.  
151 See Ketchum, supra note 18. 
152 See Capital Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Investor Protection, 
Enhancing Oversight of Private Pools of Capital, and Creating a National Insurance 
Office: Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 241 (2009) (statement of David 
Tittsworth, Executive Director & Executive Vice President, Investment. Adviser 
Association), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_ 
house_hearings&docid=f:55810.pdf [hereinafter “Tittsworth”]; Letter from Daniel J. Barry, 
Dir., Fin. Planning Ass’n, to Marcia E. Asquith, Office of the Corporate Sec’y, FINRA, 
(June 13, 2008), available at http://www.fpanet.org/docs/assets/7AF3A08D-1D09-67A1-
AC67E784F6EBD7E6/RN0824Comments.pdf [hereinafter “Financial Planning Association 
Letter”].  
153 See Tittsworth, supra note 152, at 15 (“[O]bligations of investment advisers cannot 
be circumscribed by a rule book no matter how voluminous.”). 
154 See id. at 12-14 (arguing instead for a fiduciary duty standard to be applied to 
broker-dealers). 
155 See id. at 15. 
156 See Financial Planning Association Letter, supra note 152, at 2 (stating that the 
Financial Planning Association would be “disappointed” with a rule that “would add to this 
confusion”). 
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lines is also undesirable to opponents because it increases the likelihood 
that investment advisers will become subject to the same three-tiered 
registration requirements and examination jurisdiction beyond what is 
currently being advocated, such as additional filing and licensing 
requirements and more burdensome electronic record-retention 
requirements.157 
Moreover, the investment adviser industry sees FINRA, the most 
prominent SRO, as too closely tied to broker-dealers to be able to adapt 
its oversight capabilities to investment advisers.158 Representatives of the 
industry argue that any commingling of the professions would favor the 
broker-dealer framework and require a rewrite of the Investment 
Advisers Act, effectively nullifying seventy years of subsequent 
interpretation.159 Opponents allege that even if FINRA made a genuine 
attempt to accommodate the distinct legal standards demanded by the 
investment adviser profession, a variety of problems would abound.160 
For example, conflicts of interest with regard to a broker-dealers’ 
balancing of customer, self, and representative interests cannot be 
squared with the duties of investment advisers.161 Further, opponents 
contend that FINRA has limited expertise in assessing the quality of 
financial advice, which is a critical skill for the oversight of the 
profession.162 
Finally, many opponents see the SEC as a perfectly able regulator 
plagued by a lack of funding.163 Opponents point to the SEC’s requisite 
expertise and experience in contending that the agency would be well-
served by increasing its resources to match the sheer number of 
 
157 See W. Hardy Callcott & Suneeta Fernandes, Who is a Broker-Dealer, Who is an 
Investment Adviser and How is That Likely to Change?, in BROKER-DEALER REGULATION 
31ST ANNUAL ADVANCED ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 143, 151 (2009).  
158 See Financial Planning Association Letter, supra note 152, at 31. 
159 See Tittsworth, supra note 152, at 5 (“[T]he fiduciary duty under the Advisers Act is 
well-established and has been applied consistently over the years by courts and the SEC.”). 
160 See Financial Planning Association Letter, supra note 152, at 30 (“These drawbacks 
include inherent conflicts of interest based on industry funding and influence, questions 
regarding transparency, accountability and oversight, due process issues in disciplinary 
proceedings, and added cost and bureaucracy.”). 
161 See id.; see also discussion infra Part I.A.2. 
162 See Financial Planning Association Letter, supra note 152, at 5-6 (“[B]ecause 
[FINRA has] no expertise in financial planning . . . they are not qualified to exercise 
meaningful supervision.”). 
163 See Edson, supra note 17; Tittsworth, supra note 152, at 28 (“The IAA strongly 
supports robust and appropriate oversight and regulation of the investment advisory 
profession by a fully-funded SEC.”). 
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registered investment advisers it oversees.164 As such, opponents of 
FINRA have advocated for a restructuring of the SEC, which has been 
accomplished by the Commission’s recent creation of specialized units 
to increase the efficiency of its investigations.165 
III. THE FEDERAL RESPONSE FAILS TO ADDRESS THE 
RESTORATION OF INVESTOR TRUST IN INVESTMENT 
ADVISERS 
Investor confidence plummeted as a reaction to the recent 
economic crisis and remains unsettled despite Congressional reforms.166 
Americans need assurance, by way of meaningful organizational 
reform, that regulators and industry professionals understand that the 
status quo will not be tolerated. Congress was wrong to remove the 
provision granting FINRA authority over registered investment 
advisers; FINRA should be delegated that responsibility as part of 
broader regulatory reform that increases the role of SROs in general in 
order to foster investor trust and establish a more trustworthy industry. 
Through this method of reform, greater responsibility would be placed 
on SROs and the industry itself to police and assume responsibility for 
its own integrity, thereby demonstrating to investors that it is an 
industry worthy of investment. Although the SEC’s efforts to bolster its 
enforcement division should be applauded, Congress has not 
demonstrated genuine concern for restoring investor confidence and has 
instead shown that it is content with the status quo. 
A. The Investment Adviser Industry Depends on Trust 
Just as trust and confidence have been shown to be driving forces 
behind economic growth, they are a critical component of our securities 
infrastructure.167 In the wake of recent market scandals and fraud, 
 
164 See Tittsworth, supra note 152, at 28-29. 
165 See Letter from David G. Tittsworth, Inv. Adviser Ass’n to The Hon. Mary L. 
Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n (Jul. 29, 2009) (on file with Seton Hall 
Legislative Journal); see also supra notes 131-133 and accompanying text. 
166 See Investor Confidence Index Historical Data, supra note 1. 
167 See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of 
the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1082 (2009). Donald Langevoort links the 
concept of confidence to the securities industry by explaining the justification for regulation: 
From this we may also gain some insight into what we mean by the elusive 
phrase ‘investor confidence’ that is so often invoked to justify regulation. On a 
near-term basis, investor confidence is a mix of sentiment and risk perception, 
KOEBEL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/6/2010  11:57 AM 
2010 FINRA’S POTENTIAL TO RESTORE TRUST 89 
investors continue to collectively pull billions of dollars from the U.S. 
stock market.168 This behavior departs from the usual trend following a 
bear market (i.e. a newly-emerged bull market like the U.S. has been 
experiencing since 2009) during which investors have continued to 
invest, pumping cash into equity stocks.169 However, investors are 
saying that their “enthusiasm about the rally is tempered by uncertainty 
in Washington [and] on the economy . . . .”170 That is, investors are not 
yet comfortable assigning their trust to—and taking risks in—the U.S. 
stock market, providing evidence that the market has lost its 
trustworthiness and, in turn, investors’ trust. 
Investment advisers hold a particularly important place within the 
securities industry as it pertains to maintaining investors’ trust. The 
Investment Advisers Act’s fiduciary standard permits investors to 
expect loyalty from their investment advisers.171 In other words, the 
relationship is necessarily one that depends on trust.172 As articulated by 
Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout: 
[T]he essence of a fiduciary relationship is the legal expectation that 
 
measurable empirically by reference to bid-ask spreads and other cost of capital 
measures. Over the longer-term, the test for investor confidence is whether 
investors might be inclined to flee the securities markets . . . . Regulation 
responds whenever there is a crisis that raises the possibility of such flight. 
Id. 
168 See Tom Lauricella, Stocks’ Run Draws Yawns From Buyers, WALL ST. J., Mar. 8, 
2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704706304575107452905427196. 
html; Ian Salisbury, Stock Pickers Losing Fans to Index Funds, WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 2010, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20100430-711078.html?mod=WSJ_latestheadlines; 
see also Gongloff et al., supra note 1 (describing investors’ return in August 2010 “to the 
safe-haven assets they have sought frequently in recent years” despite that, in July 2010, 
“stocks and other risky investments were rallying in response to solid corporate profits”). 
169 See Chip Brian, Buy Signal Still in Effect for U.S. Markets, Says Kollar, BENZINGA, 
(Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.benzinga.com/press-releases/c255334/buy-signal-still-in-effect-
for-u-s-markets-says-kollar; Post-Massive Bear Market Rallies, CHARTOFTHEDAY.COM, 
(Apr. 17, 2010), http://beforeitsnews.com/news/33818/Chart_Of_The_Day:_Post-
massive_Bear_Market_Rallies.html; Lauricella, supra note 168.  
170 Lauricella, supra note 168. 
171 See Transamerica Mtg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979); HUNG, ET 
AL., supra note 142, at 117 (investment advisers “acknowledged that their business 
relationships with clients are built on trust rather than investor understanding of the services 
and responsibilities involved and that it is crucial for the financial service industry to 
maintain that foundation of trust”). Cf. Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On 
Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 938 
(2006) (arguing that an expectation of loyalty is justified when such a duty is imposed by 
law, as in the case of an investment adviser). 
172 See discussion supra Part I.A.2. 
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the fiduciary will adopt the other-regarding preference function that 
is the hallmark of trustworthy behavior. Moreover, the law 
encourages fiduciaries to do this not only or even primarily by 
threatening punishment but by framing the relationship between the 
fiduciary and her beneficiary as one that calls for a psychological 
commitment to trustworthy, other-regarding behavior.173 
Because the fiduciary duty standard imposes subjective 
requirements to avoid conflicts of interest with clients and to act in their 
best interests, the badge of the relationship is the primacy of the clients’ 
interests, lest regulatory penalties be imposed.174 
This fiduciary—i.e. trusting—element is what distinguishes the 
relationships between other contracting parties in the securities 
industry.175 In contrast stands the relationship between broker-dealers 
and their customers, which—as a result of compensation practices that 
incentivize a broker to trade more often for his customer despite the 
customer’s investment objectives—often finds itself wrestling with the 
interests of the broker versus the customer.176 However, SROs have in 
place strict rules against such broker “churning” of a customer’s 
account, as well as rules designed to address other specific conflicts of 
interest.177 Thus, SRO presence is crucial to providing rules-based 
prohibitions and discipline, in contrast to forcing investors to place what 
may amount to blind faith in their investment adviser. 
B. Projecting the Right Image to Investors 
Despite the extent to which the federal government assumed 
control over the markets with the Securities Acts, it notably left the 
internal structure intact, thus “set[ting] forth the view that self-
regulation was the best first-line defense against unethical or illegal 
 
173 Blair & Stout, supra note 58, at 1743. 
174 See discussion supra Part I.A.2. 
175 See Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND 
AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 61 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 
1985) (describing a fiduciary’s obligations to beneficiary); Blair & Stout, supra note 58, at 
1782-83 (distinguishing fiduciaries from non-fiduciaries in terms of a duty to abandon self-
interest for the sake of one’s client); discussion supra Part I.A.2. 
176 See Christopher M. Gorman, Note, Are Chinese Walls the Best Solution to the 
Problems of Insider Trading and Conflicts of Interest in Broker-Dealers? 9 FORDHAM J. 
CORP. & FIN. L. 475, 481 (2004) (detailing the numerous ways in which a broker’s interests 
can be at odds with a customers’.); POSER, supra note 39. 
177 See supra note 47. 
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securities practices.”178 SROs have consistently been perceived as 
inherently well-suited regulatory bodies. As recognized by Congress, 
SROs are best suited to detect illegal practices due to industry 
experience and expertise.179 The goal of organizational reform should be 
to “set in place institutional mechanisms that will induce [potential] 
parties to exchange . . . “180 FINRA’s combination of expertise and 
enforcement capabilities would fulfill this goal and should be utilized to 
display to investors that the industry will hold itself accountable and can 
be reformed into being more trustworthy. 
Expanding FINRA’s oversight to encompass investment advisers 
will send a functionally similar message to the investing public as 
Roosevelt’s Blue Eagle symbol did to consumers.181 The striking 
similarities between investor confidence and trust in the financial 
markets today and during the Great Depression merit similar 
organizational restructuring. The securities industry, through scandals 
like Bernie Madoff’s investment fraud, has shown itself to be vulnerable 
to greed and manipulation. What better opportunity to show to investors 
that reform is serious and that their trust is genuinely desired? Only by 
restructuring investment adviser oversight to include a self-regulatory 
intermediary like FINRA, with its unmatched ability to incentivize 
compliance through formal sanctions and reputational harm, can the 
industry demonstrate the necessary intent to the public. 
Moreover, self-accountability within the industry will better 
 
178 Friedman, supra note 10, at 738-39 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
179 See Self-Regulation, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,256, 71,256-57 (proposed Dec. 8, 2004) 
(describing role of self-regulation in securities). SROs have a relatively infinite amount of 
experience regulating the securities industry – the NYSE alone has been doing it for over 
two hundred years. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 10, at 738-40; Hunter, supra note 1, at 
646-47 (describing history and experience of SROs). James Miller discusses the benefits of 
self-regulation where he states that: 
[S]elf-regulation directly involves the parties who will generally have the best 
institutional knowledge about the need for action and about the efficacy of 
various potential actions. Although government can always hire the technical 
expertise needed to draft complicated regulations, it will almost always be 
slower in perceiving the need for some action than will the participants in the 
relevant market. 
James C. Miller, The FTC and Voluntary Standards: Maximizing the Net Benefits of Self-
Regulation, 4 CATO J. 897, 897 (1985), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/ 
journal/cj4n3/cj4n3-11.pdf. 
180 NICHOLAS MERCURO & STEVEN G. MEDEMA, ECONOMICS AND THE LAW: FROM 
POSNER TO POST-MODERNISM AND BEYOND 255 (2d ed. 2006). 
181 See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text. 
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incentivize investors to once again invest and begin to trust financial 
professionals. The basic principal to be extracted from research linking 
trust to economic behavior is that a trustworthy industry begets investor 
trust and confidence.182 Our federal securities laws impose fiduciary 
duties on investment advisers, but those duties should not appear to be 
forced; investment advisory firms can demonstrate their trustworthiness 
to investors by submitting themselves to the intra-industry enforcement 
of securities laws. 
C. Inhibiting Trust 
The current investment adviser regulatory regime provides insight 
into the shortfall of investor confidence: regulatory black holes exist 
that allow some financial professionals to operate virtually under the 
radar183 and investors have increasingly fewer reasons, in the wake of the 
Madoff, Stanford, and similar scandals, to trust that their investments 
are protected and being managed by a true fiduciary. For this reason, the 
proper response is not a simple shift in resources and federal 
enforcement priorities as a reaction to the scandal du jour. Investors 
have weathered the Enrons and Madoffs and see that fraud, in one 
incarnation or another, is incentivized in the market; reactionary 
policies that address problems ex-post will preserve the status quo and 
similarly act as a disincentive to investment. 
Expanding SEC resources for the purpose of increasing 
enforcement and investigation efforts may very well prevent future 
scandals in the securities industry. Efforts to streamline and enhance the 
enforcement and investigatory processes should be applauded for 
addressing shortcomings and correcting missteps. Further, these efforts 
send a powerful message to potential perpetrators regarding federal 
regulators’ enforcement priorities. However, taken with the 
Administration’s anti-Wall Street rhetoric,184 the signal being sent to 
investors is that the industry is one that cannot be trusted and needs to 
be coerced to fulfill its statutory duties. A regulatory scheme that 
emphasizes SEC rather than SRO protection “precludes any opportunity 
for genuine trust and trustworthiness by ensuring that everybody acts 
under legal coercion.”185 As such, the social context of the SEC as the 
 
182 See discussion supra Part I.B. 
183 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
184 See supra note 118.  
185 Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 573 (2001). 
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regulator of investment advisers fails to foster the requisite trust needed 
to restore investor confidence in their fiduciaries.186 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Without trust in our regulatory regime—rather, without a 
trustworthy regulatory regime—investor confidence will wane and 
prevent long-term financial recovery. Just as the SEC was born out of 
the market crash of 1929, the current crisis of confidence requires a 
significant organizational restructuring. By focusing on the role of trust 
in economic activity, the critical impact of self-regulatory organizations 
on investors’ trust in the securities industry is uncovered. The need for 
investors to perceive systemic change and enhanced trustworthiness is 
as important as the actual reforms themselves; if investors will not 
invest their faith in a troubled industry, we risk being stuck with the 
status quo that has failed so many. 
 
 
186 See Blair & Stout, supra note 58, at 1785 (“[T]he key to a successful fiduciary 
relationship lies in framing both economic and social conditions so as to encourage the 
fiduciary to make a psychological commitment to further her beneficiary’s welfare rather 
than her own.”). 
